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Abstract
Recent research has proposed several ways in which overconfident traders
can persist in competition with rational traders. This paper oﬀers an addi-
tional reason: overconfident traders do better than purely rational traders at
exploiting mispricing caused by liquidity or noise traders. We examine both
the static profitability of overconfident versus rational trading strategies, and
the dynamic evolution of a population of overconfident, rational and noise
traders. Replication of overconfident and rational types is assumed to be in-
creasing in the recent profitability of their strategies. The main result is that
the long-run steady-state equilibrium always involves overconfident traders
as a substantial positive fraction of the population.
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1 Introduction
Several recent papers have argued that investor overconfidence or shifts in
confidence oﬀer a possible explanation for a range of anomalous empirical
patterns in securities markets.1 An important general objection to such ap-
proaches is that rational traders ought to make profits at the expense of the
irrational ones, so that irrationality should in the long run be eliminated as
a significant factor in the market.2
This paper oﬀers a new reason for the possible long-run survival of over-
confident traders in competition with rational traders. The basic idea is that
risk averse, overconfident traders trade more aggressively based on valid infor-
mation than do rational traders. As a result, overconfident traders are better
able to exploit risky profit opportunities created by the trades of liquidity-
motivated traders or the mistakes of noise traders.3 Overconfident investors
1Odean (1998) examines investor overconfidence, overreactions, and the high volume of
trade in securities markets. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998, 2000) examine
the consistency of overconfidence and shifts in confidence with abnormal post-event returns
in event studies, short horizon stock price momentum, long run reversal, short- versus long-
horizon correlations between accounting performance and later stock price performance,
and the relative ability of size, fundamental/price ratios, and risk measures to predict
future returns. Odean (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) also
examine conditions under which there will be excess or insuﬃcient volatility of security
returns relative to a rational benchmark.
2Luo (1998) provides a model of natural selection in which irrational traders lose money
and the market evolves toward long run eﬃciency. Also, Figlewski (1978, 1982) finds that
owing to wealth shifts among traders with diverse information, informational eﬃciency
may or may not be achievable depending on the correlation of signals received by the
traders and depending on the degree of traders’ risk aversion.
3Apart from this informational benefit, overconfident investors who underestimate risk
can potentially benefit from exploiting the risk premium on a positive net supply risky
asset (i.e., investing heavily in the ‘market portfolio’). This non-informational eﬀect was
noted previously in DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990), discussed below.
We rule out this eﬀect by assuming here that the risky security is in zero net supply.
1
trade aggressively both because they underestimate risk and because they
overestimate the conditional expected value from their trading strategies.
Since the information they exploit is valid, their more aggressive use of it
(either long or short on the risky asset) causes them to earn higher expected
profits (though lower expected utility). Their expected profits are limited
by the fact that if there are too many overconfident traders, or if their con-
fidence is too extreme, their trading pushes price against them excessively.
Rational traders then profit by trading in opposition to overconfident traders.
If trader types replicate according to the profitability of their strategies, we
show that overconfident traders survive in the long run, and can even drive
out rational traders completely.
Several authors, beginning with De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Wald-
mann (1990, 1991), have oﬀered other distinct arguments as to why im-
perfectly rational traders, including overconfident ones, may survive in the
long run.4 De Long et al (1991) examine traders who are overconfident in the
sense that they underestimate risk. As a result of underestimating risk, these
traders hold more of the risky asset (e.g., the market portfolio). Since the
risky asset earns higher expected return, these traders can do well relative
to rational traders.
Our approach diﬀers from De Long et al (1991) in the following respects.
4For example, noise traders themselves create a risk in the price that discourages ra-
tional traders from betting against them. Noise traders bear a disproportionate amount
of the risk that they themselves create, and therefore may earn a correspondingly higher
risk premium. In this sense they can “create their own space.” De Long et al (1990) point
out that, as a result, noise traders can earn higher expected profits than rational traders.
Palomino (1996) shows that small market size can further enhance the survivorship of
noise traders.
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First, we model overconfidence as overestimation of the precision of private
information signals. We therefore derive beliefs endogenously about the pay-
oﬀ of the risky asset. Overconfidence in our sense implies underestimation of
risk, consistent with their assumption. It also implies incorrect conditional
means. Their assumption of a noise component of trades is implicitly consis-
tent with misassessment of conditional means. However, by deriving beliefs
endogenously, our model goes further by constraining the relation between
errors in mean assessments and underestimation of risk. In our model the
misperceptions of both first and second moments are determined endoge-
nously through Bayes rule.
Second, we model prices endogenously. We would often expect irrational
traders who trade in a certain direction (e.g., buying a hot internet start-up)
to push the price unfavorably to themselves. This influence on price tends to
reduce the long-run expected profits to irrational trading. For example, on
Friday November 13, 1998, in the first hours of trading after the initial public
oﬀering of TheGlobe.com, the price quickly leaped from the oﬀer price of $9
to a price of $97, reflecting enthusiasm on the part of individual investors.
By the end of the day the price had fallen by about 1/3, so many investors
who bought in the aftermarket took heavy losses. Given the possible adverse
eﬀects on price, it is interesting to see whether irrational traders can survive
despite having an influence on price.
Third, the results of De Long et al (1991) are driven mainly by a non-
informational eﬀect, that overconfident individuals who underestimate risk
tilt their portfolios heavily toward the ‘market’ (high risk/high return) se-
curity. In our paper, the high profits of the overconfident arise from the
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overreaction in their assessments of mean, so that these investors exploit
their information more aggressively in either a long or short direction. (This
eﬀect is reinforced by their underestimation of risk, but would work even
if they did not underestimate risk. In contrast, underestimation of risk is
essential to the result of De Long et al (1991).) In so doing, they gain profits
by exploiting the mispricing created by liquidity/noise traders. In our model
overconfidence is profitable even if the risky security is in zero net supply;
it is not a matter of investing more heavily in the market portfolio, but of
exploiting information more intensely.
Kyle and Wang (1997) provide a distinct reason for the survival of over-
confident traders based on imperfect competition in securities markets. An
informed trader who knows he is trading against an overconfident informed
opponent chokes back on his trades, to the benefit of the overconfident
trader.5 An informed trader knows that the price execution in the direc-
tion indicated by his signal will be less favorable by virtue of the fact that
the overconfident informed trader will trade aggressively based on the same
signal. Being perceived as overconfident is in eﬀect like being a Stackelberg
leader, which generates oligopoly profits. Benos (1999) develops this theme
to examine cases of imperfectly correlated signals. Fischer and Verrecchia
(forthcoming) examine ‘heuristic’ traders who, owing to overconfidence or
base-rate underweighting, overreact to new signals. In their paper as well,
overreaction creates a ‘first mover’ advantage for heuristic traders owing to
5Wang (1997) extends the Kyle and Wang (1997) framework to a dynamic setting to
show that overconfident traders can survive in the long run.
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imperfect competition. In all three papers, holding constant the behavior of
other traders, trading more aggressively reduces expected profits; the only
benefit of overconfidence comes from being perceived as such by other in-
formed traders. Furthermore, in all three papers, the eﬀects described are
only important if the mass of informed traders, and especially overconfident
traders, is high enough to influence prices significantly.
In contrast with the commitment approach of these papers, in our model
traders are perfectly competitive. Traders observe the market price and take
it as given. Thus, a trader does not limit the size of his position out of fear
that an overconfident informed trader will trade intensely in the same direc-
tion. The benefit to overconfidence in our model is that overconfident traders
are willing to take on more risk, and hence better exploit the mispricing gen-
erated by the trades of ‘noise’ or liquidity traders. Unlike the commitment
approach discussed above, in our model this benefit applies even if there is
only a very small measure of informed traders. In other words, the profits
arise not from the commitment to be aggressive (and the desirable eﬀects of
such commitment upon the behavior of other traders), but directly from the
aggressiveness of the trading strategy.6
In principle, an overconfident trader ought to learn based on his past per-
formance that the precision of his signal is not as great as he thought. If such
learning were rational, overconfidence would disappear. This line of reason-
ing clashes with the extensive empirical evidence from psychology, based on
6Benos (1999) describes his model (the same applies to the other two papers as well) as
follows: “Our result comes from a first mover advantage, not from excessive risk-taking.”
In our model, the result comes from the combination of misperception of means and
aggressive risk-taking, not from a first mover advantage.
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both experimental, survey and case research, that most individuals tend to be
overconfident.7 We do not model the process by which individuals learn about
their own abilities; see however, the analyses of Daniel, Hirshleifer and Sub-
rahmanyam (1998) and Gervais and Odean (2000). These models are based
on evidence from psychology that in updating beliefs about their own abil-
ities, individuals tend to credit themselves for favorable outcomes strongly,
and to blame external factors for unfavorable outcomes (Daniel, Hirshleifer
and Subrahmanyam (1998) discuss several such studies.) This phenomenon
is termed self-attribution bias. This bias in the learning process explains
why overconfidence exists persistently. Such an eﬀect tends to maintain the
importance of overconfidence in a dynamic steady state even if overconfident
traders lose money. Our approach diﬀers in that we do not allow a trader’s
confidence to grow over time. Nevertheless, overconfident traders can thrive
profitably.
Section 2 of the paper describes the basic model with three types of agents
(rational, overconfident and liquidity/noise traders) who invest in a risk-free
and a risky asset. Section 3 models the long-run survival of overconfidence
in an evolutionary process where trader types replicate according to their
expected profits. Section 4 describes results, and Section 5 gives concluding
remarks.
7In a review of psychology and finance, DeBondt and Thaler (1995) comment that
“perhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment is that people are over-
confident.” Odean (1998) provides a detailed summary of the evidence.
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2 The Static Model
Consider a one-period competitive market consisting of two types of secu-
rities, a risk-free security with a constant payoﬀ equal to one, and a risky
security with a payoﬀ equal to θ, where θ is a normally distributed random
variable with mean θ and variance σ2θ . There are three types of agents: ratio-
nal traders, overconfident traders, and liquidity/noise traders. Both rational
and overconfident traders receive a signal with respect to the payoﬀ of the
risky asset, denoted as s, where s = θ+, and where  is normally distributed
with E() = 0 and V ar() = σ2ε and is independent of θ. The distribution of
θ is known to both rational and overconfident traders. The rational traders
correctly perceive the distribution of  (i.e., Er() = 0 and V arr() = σ2
where the subscript r indicates a rational trader). Overconfident traders
believe that the variance of the residual error () is smaller than the true
residual error variance (i.e., V arc() = σ2c < σ2 , where the subscript c indi-
cates an overconfident trader). We assume that σ2c > 0, i.e., overconfident
traders recongnize that their signal is imperfect.
Both rational and overconfident traders choose a portfolio to maximize
expected utility of wealth (denoted as wi for i = r, c) at the end of the
period, based on their interpretation of the signal, s. Trader i’s utility
function is assumed to be exponential, U(wi) = −e−awi, a > 0, where a is
the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion. Together with normality, this implies
a mean-variance expected utility function. The wealth at the end of the time
period for each trader is the sum of the initial wealth (denoted as w) and the
gain derived from the two types of assets. Since the payoﬀ of the risk-free
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asset is always one, for trader i (i = r, c), wi = w + Xi(θ − p), where Xi
is trader i’s demand for the risky asset and p is its price . Therefore, for
i = r, c, trader i’s demand function Xi is the solution to
max
Xi
Ei(wi |s)− a
2
V ari(wi |s),
s.t. wi = w +Xi(θ − p).
Since θ and s are independent and normally distributed,
Ei(θ |s) = θ + σ
2
θ
σ2θ + σ2i
(θ − θ + ) and V ari(θ |s) = σ
2
θσ2i
σ2θ + σ2i
,
where σ2i = σ2 for i = r and σ2i = σ2c for i = c. This further implies that
trader i’s demand function is
Xi =
θ + ηi(θ − θ + )− p
avi
, (1)
where
ηi =
σ2θ
σ2θ + σ2i
, and vi =
σ2θσ2i
σ2θ + σ2i
.
Note that ηc > ηr and vc < vr, hence, |Xc| > |Xr| . In other words, overcon-
fident traders’ higher conditional mean and lower conditional variance about
the risky asset’s payoﬀ result in taking a larger long or short position.
The total demand for all liquidity/noise traders is x, where E(x) = 0 and
V ar(x) = σ2x. Within the subset of the population consisting of rational and
overconfident traders, let λ denote the proportion of rational traders, and
1− λ the proportion of overconfident traders. Assuming the supply of risky
assets is zero, the market clearing condition for the risky asset is
λXr + (1− λ)Xc = −x. (2)
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Substituting equation (1) into equation (2), the equilibrium price of the
risky asset can be solved as
p =
bθrλvc + (1− λ)bθcvr + avrvcx
λvc + (1− λ)vr
,
where bθi = θ + ηi(θ − θ + ) for i = r, c. Note that E(p) = θ. Furthermore,
the expected profit for trader i can be calculated as
πi(λ) = E(Xi(θ − p)) for i = r, c.
Specifically, for the rational trader
πr(λ) =
σ2σ2θ
h
(λ− 1)2 (σ2 − σ2c )
2
+ a2σ2x (σ2c )
2
(σ2θ + σ2 )
i
a [λσ2θσ2c + (1− λ)σ2σ2θ + σ2cσ2 ]
2 ,
and for the overconfident trader
πc(λ) =
σ2σ2θ
h
λ (λ− 1) (σ2 − σ2c )
2
+ a2σ2xσ2cσ2 (σ2θ + σ2c )
i
a [λσ2θσ2c + (1− λ)σ2σ2θ + σ2cσ2 ]
2 .
The expected profit for both types of traders is a function of the variance
of the risky asset’s payoﬀ, the variance of noise trading, the variance of the
signal perceived by the rational traders, the variance of the signal perceived
by the overconfident traders, the degree of risk aversion and the relative size
of overconfident traders to the rational traders.
The diﬀerence in the expected profits for both types of traders is shown
to be
πr(λt)− πc(λt) =
σ2σ2θ
h
(1− λt) (σ2 − σ2c )
2 − a2σ2θσ2cσ2x (σ2 − σ2c )
i
a [λtσ2θσ2c + (1− λt)σ2σ2θ + σ2cσ2 ]
2 .
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3 The Dynamic Model
To examine the long-run survival of overconfident traders, we embed the
static model of Section 2 within an evolutionary process in which trader
types replicate diﬀerentially over time according to the profitability of their
strategies.8 This is reasonable because the existing traders tend to use the
strategy which has proven to be profitable and the new traders also tend to
imitate the profitable strategy as well. The natural selection process works
as follows. If the expected profit for trader i is greater (less) than for trader
j, for i, j ∈ {r, c} and j 6= i, then in the next time period the proportion of
trader i increases (decreases). If the expected profits for both sets of traders
are equal, then the proportion of traders remains the same in the following
period. Specifically, let the fraction of the population of rational traders
follow the following dynamics:
λt+1 = λt + f(πr(λt)− πc(λt);λt), (3)
where f(·) maps from (−∞,+∞) × [0, 1] → [0, 1] is a continuous function
with the following properties:
(i) f(·) = 0 if πr(λt)− πc(λt) = 0, and λt ∈ (0, 1),
(ii) f(·) < 0 if πr(λt)− πc(λt) < 0 and λt > 0,
(iii) f(·) = 0 if lim
λt→0+
(πr(λt)− πc(λt)) ≤ 0,
(iv) f(·) > 0 if πr(λt)− πc(λt) > 0 and λt < 1,
8Our assumption that replication is based on profits rather than utility is based on
the notion that opportunities to observe others may be limited, and that with a single
observation it is easier to estimate profit than risk or utility.
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(v) f(·) = 0 if lim
λt→1−
(πr(λt)− πc(λt)) ≥ 0.
The above class of dynamics is general enough to encompass standard ones
such as replicator dynamics and many other types of selection dynamics used
in evolutionary game theory (see Taylor and Jonker (1978), Weibull (1995)).
It is similar to that used by Luo (1999).9
This type of selection dynamics is based on the diﬀerence in the average
outcomes of the population of rational traders and the population of over-
confident traders. With a continuum of individuals, the average outcome of
a population is equal to the expected profit of one trader in that population.
Thus, this selection dynamic can be derived in a setting where trader types
replicate based on the realized profits of individuals. For example, suppose
that at the end of each period, each trader randomly samples (or meets)
another trader. If the sampled trader is the opposite type to the given trader
(i.e., one is overconfident and the other is not), and if the sampled trader
made greater realized profit in that time period, then the given trader will
switch to be the type of this sampled trader with some positive probability;
otherwise the given trader remains the same type. This evolutionary process
based on the realized profits at the individual level produces a selection dy-
namic based on the average outcome of populations.
The dynamic equilibrium is defined to be either an interior fixed point
(case (i) above) or a corner solution (case (iii) or case (v) above) of the above
dynamics. We denote the dynamic equilibrium as λ.
9Examples of individual micro behavior (imitation or adaptation) that produce this
type of population-based selection dynamics can be found in standard evolutionary game
theory textbooks (see also Taylor and Jonker (1978), Weibull (1995), and Luo (1999)).
11
4 Results
This section relates the long-run proportion of surviving overconfident traders
to the underlying parameters of the model, such as the degree of overconfi-
dence, noise volatility, and the volatility of underlying security payoﬀs.
Proposition 1 For all positive parameter values (a, σ2x, σ2c , σ2θ , σ2 ), there is
a unique dynamic equilibrium. Regardless of the initial fraction of overconfi-
dent traders 1−λt, the market always converges to this dynamic equilibrium.
The equilibrium has the following properties:
(i) If a2σ2xσ2cσ2θ < σ2 − σ2c , then the dynamic equilibrium is the interior fixed
point where λ = 1− a
2σ2xσ2cσ2θ
σ2−σ2c
.
(ii) If a2σ2xσ2cσ2θ ≥ σ2 −σ2c , the dynamic equilibrium is the corner point where
λ = 0 (all overconfident traders).
(iii) The dynamic equilibrium cannot be the corner point where λ = 1.
(iv) The higher is the volatility of the underlying security payoﬀ (σ2θ), the
higher is the proportion of overconfident traders in the equilibrium.
(v) The more volatile is liquidity/noise trading (the higher is σ2x), the higher
is the proportion of overconfident traders in the equilibrium.
(vi) The greater the confidence of the overconfident traders, the lower is the
proportion that survive in the equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix
We now comment on the results in order:
(i) If a2σ2xσ2cσ2θ < σ2 − σ2c , then for all positive parameters, no matter where
λt starts in the interval (0, 1), it evolves into the interior fixed point where
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the rational traders and the overconfident traders coexist. Thus, so long as
there is some liquidity/noise trading, and overconfidence is not too severe, the
overconfident traders will persist in the long run. Intuitively, overconfident
traders place greater weight on the signal optimistically, and therefore take a
bigger (or more risky) position and better exploit the misvaluation created by
liquidity/noise traders than do rational traders. Consequently, overconfident
traders survive in the long run. However, if there are too many overconfident
traders, the prices would be pushed against them excessively and rational
traders would gain at the expense of overconfident traders by trading in the
opposite direction to the overconfident traders. Hence, the rational traders
survive in the long run as well.
(ii) If a2σ2xσ2cσ2θ ≥ σ2 − σ2c , for all positive parameter values, rational traders
are driven out of the market and only overconfident traders survive in the
long run. For example, if σ2c is close to σ2 (i.e., low overconfidence), then
overconfident traders do not trade too aggressively; consequently, the sur-
vival of overconfident traders is favored. This inequality also indicates that
overconfident traders could be so favored by high risk aversion (high a), high
volatility of liquidity/noise trading (high σ2x) or high volatility in the under-
lying asset value (high σ2θ) that rational traders are driven out of the market
completely.
(iii) As long as liquidity/noise trading is present, λ = 1 cannot be an equi-
librium, since overconfident traders can better exploit noise than rational
traders and survive in the market. However, we have shown (proof available
on request) that if liquidity/noise trading vanishes (σ2x = 0) or overconfi-
dence is extreme (σ2c = 0), then overconfident traders are driven out of the
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market.10
(iv) The higher is the volatility coming from the underlying security payoﬀ,
the larger is the proportion of surviving overconfident traders.11
As volatility of the underlying security payoﬀ increases, rational traders
are not able to infer as clearly that a high price indicates overvaluation. This
increases the riskiness for them of a contrarian strategy of selling when price
is high and buying when price is low. The perceived risk of this strategy is
reduced by observation of the private information signal, but this perceived
risk reduction is greater for the overconfident. As a result, higher volatility
of underlying security payoﬀ increases the relative expected profitability for
the overconfident. Figure 1 plots the increasing relationship between the
long-run proportion of surviving overconfident traders and σ2θ .
(v) As the volatility of liquidity/noise trading increases, the equilibrium pro-
portion of overconfident traders increases as well. Noise creates misvalua-
tion, which oﬀers greater profit opportunities for overconfident traders than
10In this model, liquidity/noise trading is constant through time (i.e., σx is constant and
positive). We do not apply a selection dynamic to such traders because the inclusion of
such traders implicitly reflects the notion that many or even all individuals are subject to
shocks in the need for cash for consumption purposes. However, an alternative perspective
is that there are traders who trade in a random independent fashion. In some settings such
traders can make money (see DeLong et al (1990, 1991)), but in others they are eventually
eliminated (see Luo (1998)). The long-run performance of such traders also depends on
the degree of the traders’ risk aversion and the correlation of the signals received by traders
(see Figlewski (1978)). Even if there is economic natural selection against noise trading,
the inclusion of a group of noise traders in the model can be viewed as reflecting random
errors to which individuals tend to be subject.
11This is also consistent with Luo (2000), who looks at the convergence of the futures
price to the spot price in a dynamic model of natural selection according to wealth. She
finds that when volatility in the underlying spot market increases, the interval around the
spot price (where the future price eventually converges to) gets larger. This allows more
room for the survival of irrational traders (e.g., overconfident traders).
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for fully rational ones. Figure 1 plots the increasing relationship between the
long-run proportion of surviving overconfident traders and σ2x.
(vi) If overconfident traders are too confident, their trading becomes too
aggressive, and the equilibrium proportion of surviving overconfident traders
decreases. Figure 2 plots the increasing relationship between the long-run
proportion of surviving overconfident traders and the perceived error variance
σ2c (an inverse measure of overconfidence).
5 Conclusion
Recent research has proposed several ways in which overconfident traders can
persist despite competition from rational traders. This paper oﬀers an addi-
tional reason: overconfident traders do better than purely rational traders at
exploiting misvaluation caused by liquidity or noise trading. Using a model of
a perfectly competitive asset market involving rational traders, overconfident
traders and liquidity/noise traders, we examine both the static profitability
of overconfident versus rational trading strategies, and the dynamic evolution
of the population of traders. Diﬀerent investor types are assumed to become
more prevalent when their strategies are more profitable.
In some cases there is an interior equilibrium with both rational and
overconfident traders. If the degree of risk aversion, the volatility of liquid-
ity/noise trading or the volatility of the underlying security payoﬀ becomes
suﬃciently large, rational traders are driven out of the market and only over-
confident traders survive. The higher the noise volatility and the higher the
volatility of the underlying security payoﬀ, the larger is the proportion of
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surviving overconfident traders. The more intense is their confidence, the
lower is the proportion of surviving overconfident traders. Finally, our main
result is that unless the degree of overconfidence is infinite, the long-run
steady-state equilibrium always involves overconfident traders surviving as a
positive fraction of the population.
16
 Figure 1 
The relationship between the surviving overconfident traders  
and either volatility or noise 
Figure 2 
The relationship between the surviving overconfident traders and 
overconfidence level 
λ−1
22 , xσσθ0
1
22
2222
c
cxa
σσ
σσσ
ε
θ
−
22
2222
1
c
cxa
σσ
σσσλ
ε
θ
−=−
λ−1
2
cσ0
1
222
2
θ
ε
σσ
σ
xa
22
2222
1
c
cxa
σσ
σσσλ
ε
θ
−=−
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
(i) Solving πr(λ) = πc(λ) results in an interior fixed point λ = 1− a
2σ2xσ2cσ2θ
σ2−σ2c
.
If a2σ2xσ2cσ2θ < σ2 − σ2c , then for all positive parameter values, λ ∈ (0, 1).
Furthermore, since for any λt < λ, πr(λt) > πc(λt) and for any λt > λ,
πr(λ) < πc(λ), using the dynamics defined in equation (3), no matter where
the λt starts in the interval (0, 1), the market converges to this interior fixed
point.
(ii) For the corner solution corresponding to λ = 0 to be an equilibrium, using
the definition of the dynamics, it requires lim
λt→0+
(πr(λt)− πc(λt)) ≤ 0. This is
true under the parameter restrictions that a2σ2xσ2cσ2θ ≥ σ2 −σ2c . Furthermore,
since for any λt > 0, πr(λt) < πc(λt), using the dynamics defined in equation
(3), no matter where the λt starts in the interval (0, 1), the market converges
to this equilibrium where λ = 0.
(iii) For the corner solution λ = 1 to be an equilibrium, the dynamics require
that lim
λt→1−
(πr(λt)− πc(λt)) ≥ 0. For all positive parameters,
lim
λt→1−
(πr(λt)− πc(λt)) =
− (σ2θ)
2 σ2σ2xa2 (σ2 − σ2c )
σ2c (σ2θ + σ2 )
2 < 0.
Therefore, the corner solution corresponding to λ = 1 cannot be an equilib-
rium.
(iv) At the interior fixed point, ∂λ∂(σ2θ)
= −a2σ2cσ2xσ2−σ2c < 0. Hence, (iv) follows.
(v) When a2σ2xσ2cσ2θ < σ2 −σ2c the dynamic equilibrium has the interior fixed
point λ = 1− a
2σ2xσ2cσ2θ
σ2−σ2c
. Since ∂λ∂(σ2x) = −
a2σ2cσ2θ
σ2−σ2c
< 0, (v) follows.
(vi) At the interior fixed point, ∂λ∂(σ2c )
= −a
2σ2θσ
2
xσ2
(σ2−σ2c )2
< 0. Hence, (vi) follows.
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